Japan’s Peace Consolidation Diplomacy

According to Gilson (2007), Japan’s Peace Consolidation Diplomacy is meant to advance the state’s international profile while tackling domestic pressure over best use of aid and the role of the Japanese military in the international arena. For a country that has been nominated over ten times as a non-permanent member to the United Nations Security Council, more international engagement is necessary since Japan’s desire to be a permanent member on the Council is no secret. Peace Consolidation Diplomacy is not limited to Japan but is more of a global debate or tact in opting to combine humanitarian intervention and aid with peacekeeping.

Japan’s Peace Consolidation Diplomacy has three pillars with the first being promotion of the peace process which can be through mediation or election assistance, the second pillar is accomplishing domestic stability and security through activities such as disarmament, demobilization as well as removal of landmines and the final pillar is humanitarian and reconstruction assistance which covers things like repatriation of refugees and restoration of basic infrastructure. Under this diplomatic debate is the concept of human security which Akimoto (2017) states that Japan has embraced among her diplomatic pillars. Human security has two aspects which is freedom from want of which Japan has contributed to financially to help in post-conflict self-sustenance and the other is freedom from fear which is tackled through peacekeeping operations. 

When it comes to military engagement abroad in peace matters, Japan’s constitution which is pacifist in nature was a stumbling block since it considers the use of violence as unjust.  Maslow (2015) opines that Japan’s passive role in the 1990-91 Gulf war faced a lot of criticism as the international community called for the state to go beyond the so called “checkbook diplomacy”. This in addition to quarrels with China over certain territories in Asia forced Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to resort to nationalism with his “pro-active pacifism” to take” Japan back” aimed at not only changing mindsets domestically but also announcing to the world that Japan is ready to participate militarily where required.

The above policy debate in Japan had to be accompanied with a legal structure for it to be operational hence the enactment of Japan’s Peacekeeping Operations Law (PKO) in 1992. Although this law has been reformed over the years, the initial concepts have remained intact. Gilson (2007) asserts that the law outlines conditions that have to be met before Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations which can be listed as the need for consent by conflicting parties to United Nations and Japanese involvement, a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties in conflict, operations must remain impartial, withdrawal of the units of the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF) if such conditions are violated and last but not least the use of weapons to be limited to protection of personnel and the vulnerable.   

So where can we trace Japan in Africa? Japan operates an overseas base in Djibouti just like many others like the United States, China, France and Germany (Maslow, 2015). Although this base was set up due to challenges caused by pirates, it is helpful for coordination in case of deployment within the continent for peacekeeping operations. Gilson (2007) adds that Japan has sent peace missions to Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda. The recent deployment in Southern Sudan under United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is the first one on the continent that faced withdrawal due to conditions of PKO not being met or violated as violence broke out between the conflicting parties that is the President Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar.

However, Bosack (2017) argues that before withdrawal from South Sudan where they had deployed 3,854 troops, Japan had built 210 kilometers of roads, completed around 500,000 square meters in site preparations, and constructed up to 94 facilities. This is far more than they had done in their previous deployments.  Bosack further states that there were some lessons learnt by the Japanese which called for adjustments to their legislation to cover issues such as coming to the aid of geographically separated persons in a measure that is called kaketsuke-keigo authority. This was necessitated by a request from South Korean Peacekeepers who Japan had to provide additional ammunitions following a distress call which was fulfilled after an emergency arrangement in Tokyo to work around the Japanese law that prohibits arming the likes of South Korea.            

From the above, we can see that Japan’s Peace Consolidation Diplomacy managed to grow from a policy document to having legal structures for its implementation leading to deployment of the military in peace operations abroad despite domestic and constitutional challenges of pacifism. Japan has shown her flexibility and the desire to increase her level of engagement in international affairs of which Africa has been a beneficiary.

References

Akimoto, D. (2017). Peacekeeping and civilian protection dilemmas. Accord. Retrieved from https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/japans-international-peace-operations-south-sudan/

Bosack, M. (2017). What Did Japan Learn in South Sudan? The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/what-did-japan-learn-in-south-sudan/

Gilson, J. (2007). Building Peace or Following the Leader? Japan's Peace Consolidation Diplomacy. Pacific Affairs, Spring, 2007, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Spring, 2007), pp. 27-47. Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia

Maslow, S. (2015). A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzō and Japan’s Evolving Security System. Asian Survey, Vol. 55, No. 4(July/August 2015), pp. 739-765. University of California Press