Uhuru Kenyatta's Foreign Policy: ‘Old Wine, New Wineskins’

Former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her biography describes Uhuru Kenyatta as capitalist and western schooled because of their family businesses and having studied in America respectively. Anderson (2003) asserts that Uhuru belongs to the powerful lineage of the Kenyatta family and was thrown into national politics by President Daniel Arap Moi untested and inexperienced.

He was Moi’s chosen successor but lost to Mwai Kibaki in the 2002 general elections. He later joined Kibaki’s administration as Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government. After being indicted by the International Criminal Court over the 2007-8 post-election violence together with William Ruto, the two used radio stations like Kameme FM and Kass FM to portray themselves as victims (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2012). According to Malik (2016), the ICC indictments enabled them to consolidate Kikuyu and Kalenjin support leading to their ascension to power in 2013 something that shows international legal interventions can be used for political gains. Others like Hervé Maupeu have described their electoral victory as effective use of populism that was based on ‘pentecostalisation’ of politics due to the several prayer rallies held to denounce the court and declare forgiveness that comes with repentance (Thibon, Fouéré, Ndeda & Mwangi, 2015).

Despite campaigning against the ICC, efforts to get Kenya out of the Rome Statute along with other African states has taken a back seat after the court dropped charges against the Kenyan suspects due to lack of evidence and lack of co-operation by the government. Leaving the ICC was always going to be an uphill battle considering African states use it as a platform to refer their opponents although the indictment of Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir was a warning signal to their perceived immunity. Locally, Uhuru became the first African president to have his re-election nullified by the supreme court in 2017, putting blame on how the electoral commission conducted the elections.

In the Steps of his Predecessors

Uhuru’s presidency has generally followed the foreign policy path of his predecessors in what can be termed as ‘old wine, new wineskins’, oscillating around liberal to neo-liberal and realist to neo-realist. Kenya continues to push her peace, trade, Pan-Africanism and global solidarity agenda through regional and international organizations like the East African Community, the African Union and the United Nations while maintaining good neighborliness as well as non-interference in internal matters of other states. The president reiterated this as Kenya successfully pitched for a vote to have a seat in the UN Security Council.

The ‘Look East’ policy picked from Kibaki’s regime is still on although Kenya has kept her trade ties with the west. Cimmino (2019) argues that this kind of foreign policy strategy has expanded economic opportunities and given African states leverage from dealing with several international actors evident in how Kenya secured funding for the standard-gauge railway from China and is now working on a free trade deal with the United States. Kenya is also a leading recipient of U.S aid in sub-Saharan Africa. The outbreak of Covid-19 has been followed by funding from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to help combat the virus and its associated effects on the economy.

Since the president is responsible for the country’s security, Uhuru has continued with the fight against terrorism. The United States remains a key ally in the Somalia war on Al-Shabaab something that has prompted the terror group to accuse Kenya of supporting U.S interests in the Horn of Africa. The Kenyan opposition has also in the past called for the withdrawal of troops from Somalia (Bar, 2016). Meanwhile, Kyed et al. (2017) opine that Uhuru Kenyatta has used international fears of terrorist activities in East Africa to put pressure on his partners to support Kenya’s military campaign in Somalia. Other partners include Israel which offers military assistance aimed at neutralizing attacks by Al-Shabaab.

Apart from terrorism, Uhuru’s challenge in the international scene remains the maritime dispute with Somalia that has threatened relations between the two countries, the hostility of Tanzanian President Pombe Magufuli towards Kenya that has left the future of the East African Community on a shaky ground, consolidating the gains made in the South Sudan peace process and environmental issues. The signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement offers a glimmer of hope when it comes to trade.

References:

Anderson, D.M. (2003). Kenya's Elections 2002: The Dawning of a New Era? African Affairs,Apr., 2003, Vol. 102, No. 407 (Apr., 2003), pp. 331-342. Oxford University Press.

Bar, J. (2016). The Problem of Islamic Terrorism in Kenya in terms of Regional Security in East Africa. Politeja, No. 42, African Studies (2016), pp. 147-164. Księgarnia Akademicka.

Cimmino, R. (2019). The Greater Rift. Harvard International Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, The Art ofRevolution Protest in Performance (SPRING 2019), pp. 18-19. Harvard International Review.

International Crisis Group. (2012). Policy Briefing: Africa Briefing N°84. Nairobi/Brussels,Kenya/Belgium.

Kyed, H.M. et al. (2017). International Influence and Perceptions. Nairobi, Kenya: DanishInstitute for International Studies.

Malik, A. (2016). Mobilizing a Defensive Kikuyu-Kalenjin Alliance: The Politicization of theInternational Criminal Court in Kenya's 2013 Presidential Election. African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 2016), pp. 48-73. Indiana University Press.

Thibon, H. et al. (2015). Kenya's Past as Prologue: Voters, Violence and the 2013 GeneralElection. Nairobi, Kenya: Twaweza Communications.