Moi’s Rise to Power and Subsequent Foreign Policy

The aim of this paper is to give a broad analysis of the circumstances that surrounded the rise of Daniel Toroitich arap Moi to become the longest serving president in the history of Kenya, starting in the year 1978 after the death of the first president Mzee Jomo Kenyatta all the way to 2002 when he handed over power. According to Kissinger (1966), foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends and that domestic structures must respond to the requirements of the environment. He then submits that the first goal of a statesman is survival. A key focus will be how the self-proclaimed ‘professor’ of politics went about his foreign policy and how the conditions at home shaped his decision making when dealing with other states. This will be presented in three parts that is his experience as he rose to power, the domestic scene and finally how he responded to the external environment. 

The Rise of the ‘professor’ of Politics

Daniel Arap Moi was the Chairman of Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and a prominent figure of the Kalenjin community who reside mainly in the Rift Valley region. KADU was formed in 1960 partly due to fears of the two major tribes that is the Luo and Kikuyu who despite their differences had found a home in the Kenya African National Union (KANU). In his thesis, Wright (1980) argues that KADU was formed with the aim of uniting smaller tribes like the Maasai, Kalenjin, Somali and Coastal groups some of whom never felt part of mainstream Kenya.  Appointed Vice President by Jomo Kenyatta in 1966 two years after KADU was forced to merge into KANU, Moi took over power in 1978 following the demise of his boss despite desperate and failed attempts to constitutionally block his ascension to the presidency by the GEMA bloc that is Gikuyu Embu Meru Association political elite.

Moi’s well-known ‘Nyayo’ philosophy was about creating a level field in development across board so that the poorer regions can catch up with those that were somehow prosperous. This was in line with what KADU had backed prior to independence in pushing for a decentralized system of governance known as ‘Majimboism’ something that Kenyatta’s government shoved off because it preferred a unitary state (Barkan & Chege, 1989). At the same time, ‘nyayoism’ addressed the continuation of domestic and foreign policies of the previous regime he served in. The foreign policies that were maintained included fighting colonialism and imperialism on the continent, support for the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations among other international organizations, Pan-Africanism, good neighborliness and positive neutrality or non-interference in internal affairs of other states. 

The nature of his leadership can be termed as populist and authoritarian. Although there have been claims that the failed coup of 1982 changed Moi, this narrative raises some doubts. He comfortably served in the previous regime that suppressed any kind of opposing views which included detention without trials and when JM Kariuki known for his criticism of the regime was assassinated, Mwai Kibaki was the only member of the cabinet who attended his burial. The only difference was that unlike Kenyatta, Moi had to deal with a broader and more powerful opposition hence became more aggressive domestically. Barkan and Chege (1989) further state that his decision making was interventionist and impulsive which bypassed the bureaucratic structure that his predecessor had relied on. He used rallies to announce new policies aimed at mass appeal and micromanaged all aspects of government.

Hell at home, Peace abroad

Moi went after GEMA when he took over the presidency in order to reduce their influence but retained some powerful figures from the previous regime that is Attorney General Charles Njonjo and Finance Minister Mwai Kibaki who became his Vice President (Barkan & Chege, 1989). The two were later forced out after the 1982 coup with Njonjo leaving the cabinet in 1983 and Kibaki being demoted in 1988. To hold on to power, Barkan (2004) asserts that Moi demanded maximum loyalty, critics were thrown out of the ruling party, local elections were rigged, suppression of the media and civil society as well as torture became the order of the day. Due to the limited political space, Kenyans turned to weddings and funerals to exchange their political views. Mwaura (2013) claims that a military operation in 1984 aimed at disarming members of the Somali Degodia clan left 3000 men dead and the rest brutalized at the Wagalla Airstrip in Wajir District. This high level of brutality in the 1980s prompted Bishop Alexander Muge to compare Kenya under Moi to apartheid South Africa yet ironically in his visit of the United States in 1987, Moi had asked President Ronald Reagan for a deeper commitment towards ending apartheid.

With such an environment locally, Moi made several foreign trips that can be termed as ‘survival’ trips. As Branch (2011) puts it, despite having the likes of Nicholas Biwott, the Kalenjin lacked capital and commercial experience of the Kikuyu who he was keen on alienating so he turned to the Asian community culminating into a visit to India in 1981. This brought about closer ties between elite Kenyan Asians and the Moi government. It is also important to note that just like Kenya, India was a member of the non-aligned movement. The Kenyan president made a visit to Somalia in the aftermath of the Wagalla massacre partly due to fear of losing the support of Britain and the United States whose diplomats in Nairobi were of the view that he had gone too far. After the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 signaling the end of the Cold War, Moi embarked on an uninvited trip to Washington in January the following year although it did not go well. Another visit which was to South Africa in 1992, a first one by a black head of state undermined the hard stance the OAU had taken against the apartheid regime but was seen as an attempt not to hurt trade ties with Britain and the United States considering Kenya was home to a number of their multinational corporations.

One of the reasons why it was important to promote peace was to facilitate trade yet trade in itself is seen by liberal theorists as a way to promote peace. The World Trade Organization makes it clear that sales people are usually reluctant to fight their customers. Moi knew that trading with other nations was essential for the development of Kenya and that could only be attained if her ‘customers’ were at peace. Kleinberg and Fordham (2010) opine that the fear of losing the benefits of trade is therefore expected to nurture friendly relations hence reduce conflicts. Moi played a key role in conflict management abroad, he represented Kenya in multilateral engagements with the United Nations as well as the Commonwealth and was a two terms chair of OAU which gave him a platform to push Pan-African agenda of peace and security. Kenya started contributing troops to peacekeeping operations as early as 1979 on top of having championed the formation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1986.

Kenyan troops have served in Chad, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Sierra Leone under the UN peace operations. IGAD was very instrumental in the Sudan and Somali peace processes. Healy (2011) asserts that the two peace process depended on Kenyan diplomatic and organizational capacity with the chief negotiators in each case coming from Kenya that is General Sumbeiwyo for Sudan and Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat for Somalia. Staying politically neutral within the region in line with her policy of positive neutrality, non-interference and good neighborliness were very vital in both cases.

Meeting the requirements of the external environment

Faced with a lot of domestic challenges to deal with, Moi used foreign policy to achieve cohesion and survival. This is seen in his visits to India and Somalia which won him the support of Kenyan Asians and facilitated reaching out to the Somali community in Kenya after the Wagalla massacre respectively. The reach out to the Somali community was fruitful to the extent that after the introduction of multi-party democracy, Noth Eastern Province voted with KANU including 2002 when most of the country was voting for Mwai Kibaki. Moi was also careful not to alienate his foreign friends such as Britain and the United States, something he handled with skill especially since he is the only Kenyan president to have been in power before and after the Cold War.

Barkan (2004), found out that Kenya signed a military agreement in 1981 with the United States which allowed the U.S. Navy and Air Force to use the port of Mombasa and Kenya’s international airports at Nairobi and Mombasa. This did not go without opposition. Branch (2011) writes that the ‘Mwakenya’ dissidents wanted an end to neo-colonialism calling it “Euro-American imperialism” including the military alliance with USA but Moi would have none of it as his administration classified them a Marxist revolutionary group and went on to crush its perceived elements. He then visited the United States in 1987 resulting into more military aid coming in. Although such military arrangements were not new in Kenya, they were more for defensive and less for offensive purposes if we look at it from a realist perspective. Lobell (2017) writes that defensive realists assert that states strive to maximize security and preserve the existing balance of power but are not necessarily aggressive.   

Branch further states that many Kenyans who ran into exile in the US, UK and Scandinavian countries like Koigi wa Wamwere and intellectuals like Atieno Odhiambo engaged in diaspora activism. They reminded the world of Moi’s authoritarianism that violated international human rights law and it was not long before the professor of politics had to deal with this reality.

After the end of the Cold War, there was less support of authoritarian leaders in Africa by the west hence on 26 November 1991, donors collectively suspended aid to Kenya amounting to $350 million subject to a curb on corruption and liberalization of the political system (Brown, 2001). Moi complied with the repeal of section 2A of the constitution which made Kenya a multiparty state. A leading supporter of opposition parties was US Ambassador Smith Hempstone nicknamed “the rogue ambassador”. Brown (2001) argues that aid donors played a great role in pushing for multipartyism but also at times worked against further democratization by legitimizing Moi’s authoritarian rule due to fear of anti-regime protests leading to a breakdown of political and economic order.  Although Ambassador Hempstone later regretted not having taken a stronger stance against the sham elections, their fears came to pass during post-election violence of 2007-2008 when Western diplomats were reluctant to endorse the results.

However, Mumo Nzau makes a case that the emergence of terrorism beginning with the August 7, 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi changed the scales of Kenya-US relations. Kenya became a strategic partner in the global war on terror as it came be known which kept alive military security co-operation between the two states (Kithinji, Koster & Rotich, 2016). At the regional level, Nzau opines that Moi improved relations with her neighbors in Eastern Africa in the 1990s as far as trade and commerce is concerned.  This was partly due to leadership changes that saw Ali Hassan Mwinyi replace Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni take over in Uganda leading to talks and eventual revival of the East African Community.

Conclusion

Many scholars have termed the 1980s to have been the golden years of Kenyan diplomacy which is in stark contrast to the kind of political oppression witnessed in that decade. Just like many other new states at the time, the need to achieve cohesion and survival made authoritarianism very attractive to the leaders of the day and Moi was no exception. When it comes to foreign policy, we can refer to his model of decision making as rational actor model due to bypassing of the bureaucratic structure and his concern for survival as one scholar put it, Moi saw real and imaginary enemies everywhere. Having gained expertise representing Kenyatta abroad on several occasions, he was the ultimate decision maker and it is said that he ignored advice from his longest serving foreign affairs Minister Robert Ouko not to make the trip to Washington in January 1990. Moi was not received well as he had been warned and Ouko was brutally murdered in February of that year.

References

Barkan, J.D., & Chege, M. (1989). Decentralising the State: District Focus and the Politics of

Reallocation in Kenya. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Sep., 1989, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 431-453. Cambridge University Press.

Barkan, J.D. (2004). Kenya After Moi by Barkan, Joel D. Foreign Affairs; New York Vol. 83, Iss.

1, (Jan/Feb 2004): 87

Branch, D. (2011). Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. US: Yale University Press.

Brown, S. (2001). Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: How foreign donors

help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power, Third World Quarterly, 22: 5,725-739, DOI:10.1080/01436590120084575

Healy, S. (2011). Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the

InterGovernmental Authority on Development. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), January 2011, Vol. 87, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 105-120. Oxford University Press.

Kissinger, H.A. (1966). Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy. Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 2,

Conditions of World Order (Spring, 1966), pp. 503-529. The MIT Press.

Kithinji, M.W., Koster, M.W., & Rotich, J.P. (2016). Kenya After 50: Reconfiguring Historical,

Political, and Policy Milestones.UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kleinberg, K.B., & Fordham, B.O. (2010). Trade and Foreign Policy Attitudes. The Journal of

Conflict Resolution, October 2010, Vol. 54, No. 5 (October 2010), pp. 687-714. Sage Publications, Inc.

Lobell, S.E. (2017). Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism. Retrieved from

https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-304#:~:text=In%20general%2C%20defensive%20realists%20maintain,security%20is%20the%20highest%20end.

Mwaura, S. (2013). The Somali Question. World Policy Journal, FALL 2013, Vol. 30, No. 3

(FALL 2013), pp. 99-106. Duke University Press.

Wright, S.J. (1980). The Foreign Policy of Kenya 1963-1978 (Thesis presented for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy). University of London, London, United Kingdom.