The Quest for African Legacy: Examining Bush-Obama Foreign Policies Towards Africa

 

Abstract

Each time a new administration takes over in the United States, there is a level of expectation whether good or bad regarding how it will deal with the rest of the world. This paper looks at some of those expectations from Africa by zeroing in on the presidencies of George Walker Bush and his successor Barack Hussein Obama. The first part covers what Africa really wanted followed by the limitations both administrations had to deal with and finally a way forward.

What did Africa want?

The election of George W. Bush in the year 2000 did not carry a lot of euphoria on the African continent if what we saw in 2008 was anything to go by. During the presidential debates, Bush blatantly stated that Africa was of no strategic importance to the United States only to surprise his critics by implementing policies towards the continent that turned out to be one of his much talked about legacies (Layman and Robinette, 2009).

Meanwhile, the election of Barack H. Obama as the 44^th president of the United States in 2008 elicited a lot of hope and excitement on the continent not only because of his black ancestry but the opportunity it presented to take United States-Africa relations to another level considering what George W. Bush his predecessor had accomplished and to be more progressive. In Kenya, the victory was crowned with a public holiday in addition to celebrations across the African continent.  Zeleza (2013) states that it was seen as a redemptive moment of historic proportions in the long fight for full equality, civil rights and citizenship among the African Americans and other marginalized populations.

President Obama therefore had the burden of either matching or exceeding Bush’s record of achievement on the continent something Layman and Robinette (2009) had already warned was going to be a tall order. The two argued at the time that despite an Obama presidency opening up a good opportunity for the empowerment of institutions of governance and civil society that can demand accountability, service and democracy, there were unresolved issues inherited from the Bush era to deal with like the crisis in Darfur, failed U.S counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, the costly civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a global trade that until now has left the continent in a state of dependency.

What were the limitations?

Before Bush and Obama, Walle (2010) claims that there was already a steady decline of American diplomatic presence in Africa as the deterioration of the institutional capacity of the State Department somehow went unabated in the two regimes. This was not helped by the contradictions in policy initiatives and objectives. At the same time and despite the rhetoric, America’s foreign policy has generally remained predictable regardless of whether a Republican or Democrat is in power with both parties supporting expansion of free trade, promoting regional stability militarily and diplomatically in addition to maintaining the so called ‘liberal world order’ after the second World War (Glaser and Thrall (2017)).

The United States has always had several desirable goals for Africa but her interests here are limited hence the preference to work through allies and proxies at the local level. This means that whenever there are more pressing demands or crises elsewhere, the agenda on Africa pays the price of neglect (Walle, 2015). In reference to John Norris, Kassa (2016) bemoans the fact that it was towards the end of his first term in June 2012 that the Obama administration finally released its Africa policy mainly to avoid embarrassment following a Washington Post report on surveillance contractors in Africa.   

According to Adebajo (2015), despite being looked at initially as a “messiah”, Obama faced many hurdles that made it difficult to accomplish much for the continent which included taking the presidency during a recession, reforming American health-care in what has come to be known as the Obama-care, Iran’s nuclear threats, dealing with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as economic and military rise of China.  This was worsened by inadequate and inconsistent Congressional support on matters United States policy towards Africa. Walle (2015) is of a similar opinion, stating that all these factors combined created an unfavorable environment to launch ambitious new foreign policy initiatives more so in a region viewed as secondary to U.S interests and a liability in the eyes of Obama and his advisers. 

What did Africa get?

As earlier stated, there was no much expectation from the Bush administration in terms of a policy change in Africa different from what had been the case before. However, President Bush is generally regarded as the best ‘African’ president the United States has ever had in recent history. During his time, aid to Africa more than tripled, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) did not only revolutionize how the world tackled the AIDS pandemic but also managed to pro-long the lives of almost 2 million people, many of whom in Africa as they easily accessed anti-retroviral treatment. In addition, there was an onslaught on other diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) initiated by the Clinton administration to allow exports from African countries have tariff-free access to the United States gained momentum, the Africa Education Initiative (AEI) was a boost for the respective sector and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to reward good governance helped provide funding for development (Layman and Robinette, 2009). 

Dyer (2014) attributes Bush’s success on the continent to a push by evangelicals who partly due to the influence of Irish rock star Bono, started taking an active role in what she calls the politics of AIDS to combat debt, infectious disease and extreme poverty in places like Africa and the Caribbean. She continues that they had now embraced a more traditionally liberal issue especially since they had initially looked at AIDS as God’s punishment for drug use, homosexuality and adultery. Nevertheless, in as much as Bush significantly increased aid to Africa, his global war on terror gave birth to accusations of favoritism. Gibier and Miller (2012) opine that the countries that supported the war in Iraq commonly referred to as the “Coalition of the Willing” enjoyed larger aid allocations than would have been expected under different circumstances. Obama did reverse that trend although both presidencies still used foreign aid to push for development and democracy while to a great extent ignoring human rights violations of the recipient states.

Under Obama, there was a continuation of most of the Bush policies and nothing much that can be considered different from previous United States administrations. As Adebajo (2015) puts it, American interactions with Africa remained militarized in pursuit of terrorists with thousands of American military personnel stationed in Djibouti and millions of dollars were spent in training programs across 35 African countries following the creation of AFRICOM in 2007. Dictatorial regimes like Equatorial Guinea and Egypt were retained as allies making Obama’s calls for “strong institutions not strongmen” a tough principle to live by and over-reliance on drone strikes in Somalia and Libya resulted in massive civilian casualties which only fueled anti-Americanism.

Adebajo (2015) further states that instead of challenging French neocolonial tendencies in West Africa, he offered assistance much to the disappointment of the continent. The perception that the United States considers Africa as a problem for France and Britain to fix persisted as nothing else can really explain low prioritization of the continent. To date, Obama holds that his support for France and Britain as NATO intervened and eventually ousted Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi to be his greatest foreign policy regret, the country is still in chaos nine years later.

It is however important to note that in talking about disappointment with Obama’s policy towards Africa and as Walle (2015) argues, does not mean he was a complete disaster. For he did not take imprudent actions like was the case with Reagan who in support of guerilla forces opposed to communist sympathetic regimes ended up escalating the civil wars in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, neither did he do something similar to Clinton’s failure to intervene during the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Even the cutting of funds towards Bush’s signature initiatives like PEPFAR and MCA had to do with budgetary limitations as a result of the recession. He just did not go beyond the normal, that is if we are to judge him by a more ambitious standard. As Zeleza (2013) puts it, his election in 2008 was extraordinary but his reelection in 2012 was ordinary due to diminished anticipations.

Despite the above assessment, Sloan (2008) asserts that a new administration does not necessarily mean a total rejection of previous policies hence the Obama administration had to make calculations based on American interests and threats to such interests which meant continuing with what is warranted while breaking new ground. Some of the successes of the Obama years include tackling Ebola outbreak in West Africa, increased humanitarian assistance to drought stricken zones, the Young African Leaders Initiative(YALI) and Power Africa meant to enhance rural electrification as well as the launch of the US-Africa Leaders and the Global Entrepreneurship Summits to promote trade relations between Africa and the United States (Kassa, 2016). 

What is the way forward?

U.S relations with Africa should not only be looked at through the prism of terrorism which has the continued effect of unquenched militarization. Unfortunately, in quoting a former Department of State diplomat, Samatar (2013) claims that it is impossible to get a hearing on African policy in the halls of power unless you define it in terms of terrorism which should not be the case. Glaser and Thrall (2017) only turn their attention to Africa when discussing drone strikes and the removal of Muamar Gaddafi in a piece meant to defend Obama’s foreign policy legacy against critics who felt he was reluctant to intervene on the world stage.

Záhorík (2010) reflects that Africa’s loss of strategic meaning after the end of the Cold War coincided with massive economic growth that has continued with the intensification of oil production and exploitation of other natural resources. It is therefore no surprise for Kassa (2016) to be of the view that there is need to move from over reliance on aid as a foreign policy tool in US-Africa relations to trade since sustainable economic growth and the integration of African economies to the global market could bring un-intended benefits of enhanced democracy as a budding middle class flexes its muscles. Initiatives like AGOA should be improved and structural changes to the operations of the Bretton Woods Institutions are necessary. 

The promotion of good governance, democracy and human rights in Africa should not be sacrificed at the altar of military cooperation in what others have called the ‘militarization’ of US-Africa relations. Doing so has been one of the key reasons corrupt and dictatorial regimes thrive as they become ready partners making it difficult to hold them accountable.

Finally, there are calls for the continent to focus beyond the occupant of the White House and tap into other promising areas such as the potential offered by the African diaspora. Zeleza (2013) believes that diaspora contribution in terms of increased remittances can help spur development in a manner that outstrips charities. Therefore, the designation of the diaspora as Africa’s sixth region by the African Union is a step in the right direction in the long search for continental integration and unity with the diaspora (Zeleza, 2011). 

Conclusion

The debate on what is in it for Africa did not end with the Bush and Obama administrations but this paper has given a sneak preview of what it was all about when the two were occupying the White House. For Bush, the expectations were exceeded that is if giving aid is the only yardstick of foreign policy success but Obama had to bear the burden of over expectation mainly because of his heritage and that can partly explain the disappointment. Whatever side you take in this continuing exchange, it is not late for Africa to look beyond what the United States president has to offer.

 

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