Did Kenyatta’s Bureaucrats Have Leverage Over Britain?

A review of the article titled ‘Playing Cold War politics’: the cold war in Anglo-Kenyan relations in the 1960s by Poppy Cullen

Cullen (2018) seeks to show the leverage newly independent states specifically Kenya had over great powers during the Cold War- an ideological battle between the capitalist leaning states led by the likes of Britain and the United States against communist or socialist leaning states led by the likes of China and the Soviet Union. The article looks at Kenya’s foreign policy in the 1960s and having been colonized by Britain how it still sought to maintain those ties although the author’s central argument is to address the level of agency Africans had in shaping and directing these relationships as the Cold War went on. This is in contrast to what had been covered by other scholars who focused more on the agency of the superpowers (Cullen, 2018, p.38).

In reference to the writings of Reynolds and McKay, the author opines that the Cold War provided Africans with more room to act and was a ‘blessing in disguise’ since it attracted greater attention to the continent beyond former colonial powers opening the door for more aid and assistance than would have been warranted had the situation been different. Cullen dismisses the notion that Kenyan policies were entirely controlled and determined by outside forces but agrees with other scholars that the room to manoeuver was fairly limited. However, the point of departure is and I quote “Kenyatta’s room for manoeuver was often substantially greater than has been previously suggested”. She then goes ahead to assert how the Kenyan elite and to a great extent the leaders used Cold War rhetoric and fears to influence the options the likes of Britain would take which in turn benefitted the budding state.

The author goes into details of the power struggles within the Kenyatta administration especially that pitting Tom Mboya who was the favored son of the West and Oginga Odinga who was portrayed as having communist links. Much of the differences between Mboya and Odinga was not entirely because of the belief in ideology but more to do with using the Cold War talk for their political gain. Odinga eventually resigned from the government to form Kenya People’s Union and Mboya was later assassinated. Meanwhile despite Kenyatta’s rhetoric, the British believed he did not have strong inclinations towards communism although they feared the possibility of him changing his mind. The catch was that for the sake of survival, Kenyatta needed the West hence the issue of non-alignment was practically difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, the fear of communism allowed the Kenyan elite to be in charge of the choices of relationships to pursue (Cullen, 2018, pp. 39- 44).

Finally, Cullen develops her argument further by suggesting that Kenya used Cold War politics in making bargains for arms supplies claiming that this gave the state an opportunity to get better deals from the British. The author argues that this was very critical because arms deals involved long-term relations that go beyond just purchase but training and maintenance of the equipment. A key example is how Kenya played the Cold War card in 1969 to buy military jets from Britain at a lower cost than earlier offered in addition to free training (Cullen, 2018, pp. 44-52).

Is the glass half empty or half full?

I find this article very enlightening and at times self-defeating but may be it has to do with the pain of trying to find leverage by a regime over a great power that it clearly needed for it to survive. The author has tried her best to that effect although it really depends on which angle one is coming from leading to the question of whether the glass is half empty or half full? She states that the article largely depends on British government sources but does not show how advantageous it was to Kenyans in making their calculations if they did not know what the British were thinking except that they feared communism. In any case, whatever concessions the British made they still benefited more from Kenya than the vice-versa. The British had interests in Kenya that included trade, investments, military ties, geostrategic interests as well as European and Asian populations yet the article focuses mostly on military aid and assistance as if it was the only interest Kenya had.

May be Cullen is looking at Kenya’s foreign policy solely from a realist perspective that puts a lot of emphasis on military strength but there is evidence to suggest that Kenya had in mind economic diplomacy and working through institutions like the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations which is a more liberal orientation.  She indeed admits that “Kenya’s military did not grow as much or as quickly as many within the continent” which seems self-defeating if you want to make military issues your key argument over other policy goals but again, I do not see beneficial leverage in Kenya turning away free offers from the Soviet Union to get jets from Britain at a cost-they still paid and Britain made money out of the sales even if it was less than what they had initially hoped for. Worse still, despite Kenya turning down offers from the Soviet, her Western partners did not always supply what was requested.

In short, Kenya was clearly in British hands so much that even military purchase from non-threatening allies like Italy and the United States with better offers was literally off the table except in the rhetoric.  My view is that the elite and the leadership at the time had limited room to flex their muscles with little left except finding their options within what was acceptable to Britain. However, the author has left me wondering whether the assassination of Tom Mboya had something to do with reducing the options Britain or to a larger extent the West had just in case Kenyatta turned against them and they needed a replacement.

References:

Cullen, P. (2018). ‘Playing Cold War politics’: the cold war in Anglo-Kenyan relations in the 1960s, Cold War History, 18:1, 37-54, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2017.1387774